

~~Rec'd~~ 5/12/71

Dan,

I've finally written
up the paper to go with
the Tables you picked up
at my parent's house
that night. Hope we can
get together to talk sometime.

Andy

495-4067 (office)
547-5944 (home)

HAWKS AND DOVES, ISOLATIONISM AND POLITICAL DISTRUST:

AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON MILITARY POLICY

Andre Modigliani
Harvard University

Asst. Prof.

April, 1971

Let out
let it over
carry on
win

Abstract

Recent studies of public opinion on Vietnam reveal a surprising positive association between Socio-economic status (SES) and support for "tougher" military policies. In an effort to extend and understand such findings, this study re-analyzes several public opinion surveys conducted during the Korean War. The demographic correlates of military policy preferences are found to be similar to those reported for the Vietnam War, but the Korean data qualify the proposition that higher SES is associated with support for "tougher" policies in two respects: (1) policy preferences of the Korean public did not appear to be organized on a simple "soft-to-tough" dimension-- those who supported escalation had only a slight inclination to ^{how?} oppose disengagement; (2) while SES was positively associated with opposing disengagement, it was not associated with supporting escalation. Factor analyses of several surveys reveal two distinct, orthogonal dimensions that underlay military policy preferences: an "isolationist-to-interventionist" dimension associated with opposition to disengagement; and a "trust-to-distrust of the Truman Administration" dimension associated with support for escalation. Respondents are sub-divided into four types in accordance with their positions on these dimensions. The demographic characteristics and military preferences of the

"either-or";
this, would
follow Pres. in
with direction;
yet, they
might later
send demagog

* so: high SES opposed disengagement (& escalation): supported stalemate
low SES don't oppose disengagement: but might prefer "defeat"
while failing to escalate, or just "defeat."

four types are analyzed, and the overall findings are discussed with reference to Vietnam as well as public opinion on military policy more generally.

HAWKS AND DOVES, ISOLATIONISM AND POLITICAL DISTRUST:
AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON MILITARY POLICY*

Social scientists, like others in academic life, have tended to be *atypically* "dovish" in their attitudes toward the Vietnam War (Armor^{et al.}, 1967; Schuman & Lauman, 1967). Partially as a consequence, they have been prone to assume that the major support for tough military policies comes from those segments of the public that are most nearly opposite to them in social characteristics: the less informed, the less educated, the working class, the poor -- in short, those lower in socio-economic status (SES). This assumption is reinforced by sporadic events such as the attack on peace marchers by construction workers in New York City -- an event followed by a large counter-march emphasizing patriotism and support for the President. What could demonstrate more clearly the working class support for tougher policies? If more scientific evidence is required, one can turn to the extensive empirical and theoretical work organized by Lipset (1959, 1960) under the heading of "working class authoritarianism." He argues persuasively that the socialization practices and social conditions that prevail in the working class make for less ego stability, shorter time perspective, and less conceptual sophistication -- all of which combine to produce more hostile, intolerant attitudes as well as greater support for extremist and absolutist policies. Though Lipset does not address himself specifically to military policy, his analysis is certainly consistent with ^{the} assumption that persons of lower SES will support tougher policies.***

* Work on this study was supported by a small grant from the National Institute of Mental Health, United States Public Health Service, Grant #1 RO3 MH17649-01. Initial funds to begin the project were received from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) Grants-in-Aid Program, and from the Clark Fund of Harvard University.

** conducive to acceptance of stability, limited war*
**** they don't necessarily care as much about foreign policy*

With considerations such as these in mind, it comes as no small surprise to learn that recent public opinion surveys provide virtually no support for this assumption. Indeed, most findings flatly contradict it. For example, in June 1966, 41% of those with a grade school education favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam as compared to only 27% of those with a college education (Gallup, 1966); in February 1967, only 51% of the grade-school educated favored continued bombing of North Vietnam as compared to fully 74% of the college-educated (Gallup, 1967); in January 1968, only 44% of the grade school educated described themselves as "hawks" while 57% of the college-educated did so (Gallup, 1968); and in September 1970, 61% of the grade-school educated and only 47% of the college-educated endorsed the Hatfield-McGovern amendment calling for an end to U.S. troop involvement in Vietnam by the end of 1971. ^(Gallup, 1970b) Based on a re-analysis of two polls conducted by the Survey Research Center during the Korean (1952) and Vietnam Wars (1964), Hamilton (1968) concludes that: "Preference for 'tough' policy alternatives are most frequent among the following groups: the highly educated, high status occupations, those with high incomes, younger persons, and those paying much attention to newspapers and magazines" (p. 439). In a recent study of voting patterns on Vietnam referenda, Hahn (1970), also, found that support for withdrawal was most prevalent in precincts characterized by lower SES.*

* The belief that those lower in SES favor tougher policies cannot quite be dismissed as a complete myth. Some findings indicate that they are more prone to support extremely belligerent policies: e.g., the less educated were slightly more prone to endorse both the bombing of cities in North Vietnam (Gallup, 1966), and the introduction of atomic weapons into the fighting (Gallup, 1968). Such policies receive little support in any quarter (about 25% nationally), and the slightly greater support for them among those lower in SES probably reflects a lesser sensitivity to the massive civilian casualties associated with them.

unsubstantiated
assumption

What is perhaps more surprising than the apparent positive association between SES and support for tougher ^{er} ~~military~~ ^{policies} is the fact that this association has been brought to our attention only recently in connection with the Vietnam war. Does this mean it is a recent development -- a peculiarity of the Vietnam War not to be found in earlier periods of the Cold War? Hamilton's (1968) brief report on the Korean War suggests not, but the question is worth pursuing more thoroughly.

The study to be reported in this paper, then, had a twofold purpose: first, to examine in detail whether the association between SES and support for tougher policies held for the period of the Korean War and, second, (assuming the association did hold) to explore some of the possible reasons for it.

Socio-economic-status and Military Policy: Preliminary Findings

Surveys, Items and Methods. Nine national sample surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) between April, 1951 and October, 1952 were selected for use in this study.* These were obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center. The particular surveys selected dealt almost exclusively with issues of foreign policy and, in addition, contained a larger than usual number of items concerned specifically with military policy in Korea.

In order to test for associations with socio-economic status, all military policy items were re-scored so that higher scores denoted support for their tougher alternative. The items, of course, differed in the toughness of their tougher alternatives (e.g., keep troops in Korea vs. bomb bases inside China).

* These were: #302 (April, 1951), #307 (May, 1951), #314 (November, 1951), #315 (December, 1951), #317 (February, 1952), #320 (March, 1952), #327 (June, 1952), #329 (August, 1952) and #332 (October, 1952). The sample sizes ranged between 1200 and 1300.

The items are listed below, roughly ordered from the softest to the toughest, and the precise scoring of each item is shown.

1. (#302, 307, 314, 315, 320, 327) Do you think the United States was right or wrong in sending American troops to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea? (1) Wrong, (2) Don't Know*, (3) Right.
2. (#302, 307) Do you think we should continue to keep our troops in Korea, or should we pull them out now? (1) Pull them out now, (2) Don't Know, (3) Keep troops there.
3. (#315, 317, 320, 327, 332) If Communist armies attack any other countries in the world, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend these countries like we did in Korea?** (1) Stay out of it, (2) Don't Know, (3) Help defend them.
4. (#314, 315, 317) Which one of these three comes closest to your idea of what we should do in Korea: (1) Pull our troops out and bring them home, (2) Don't Know, (3) Continue the war on the present basis while the truce talks continue, (4) Attack the Communist forces with everything we have?
5. (#320, 327, 329, 332) Suppose the truce talks in Korea broke down completely. Which one of these three things do you think we should do then? (1) Pull our troops out and bring them home, (2) Don't Know, (3) Keep our troops in Korea and hold the present line there, (4) Go ahead and attack the Chinese Communists.

* Here as on all items "don't know" was not explicitly offered as an alternative to the respondent, but a "don't know" response was recorded as such.

** On surveys #317, and 320 the question was worded slightly differently as follows: "If the Chinese Communists attack any other country in Asia, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend that country?" The effect was to increase very slightly (4 to 6%) sentiment to stay out.

6. (#302, 307, 320, 327, 329) Do you think U.S. airplanes should or should not cross the Korea border and bomb Communist supply bases inside China? (1) Should not, (2) Don't know, (3) Should.
7. (#302, 307, 320) Would you approve or disapprove of the United States giving the Chinese Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-Shek all the help it needs to attack the Communists on the mainland of China? (1) Disapprove, (2) Don't Know, (3) Approve.
8. (#314, 317, 320, 327, 329) Do you think we will reach an agreement in the next month or so to stop the fighting in Korea? (1) Yes, (2) Don't Know. If "No," Do you think we should continue the truce talks or should we break them off now? (1) Continue, (2) Don't Know, (3) Break off.*
9. Do you think the United States should go to war against Russia now? (1) No, (2) Don't Know, (3) Yes.

Four demographic variables were used to measure socio-economic-status: Education, Occupational Status, Race, and Economic Level (the last represents an interviewer estimate of the respondent's standard of living). These four were also combined into a single index of socio-economic-status (SES index). All variables were scored so that higher scores denoted higher SES.**

* Note that a respondent received a score of "1" either by expecting agreement within a month or by favoring continuation of the talks. In effect, it was assumed that respondents expecting agreement soon would want to continue the talks.

** Scoring was as follows: Education -- (1) no formal schooling to 11th grade, (2) 12th grade to college; Occupational Status -- (1) Blue collar, (2) Farmer, (3) White collar; Race -- (1) Non-white, (2) white; Economic Level -- (1) Low or below average, (2) Medium or Average, (3) High or above average. The SES index represented the sum of these four variables. All variables were made dichotomous before summing by dropping farmers and by combining medium and high scores on economic level into a single category. Scores on the SES index ranged from 4 to 8 and were recoded as follows: (1) Low = scores of 4 or 5, (2) Medium-Low = score of 6, (3) Medium High = score of 7, (4) High = score of 8.

A measure of Level of Information could also be obtained on certain surveys through items that asked the respondent whether he had "read or heard about" specific events in the news (e.g., "have you read or heard anything about the recent troubles between the British and the Egyptians in Egypt?"). In general, no more than one such item appeared on any given survey and it was always scored so that higher scores denoted higher knowledge.

In addition to these variables, three other demographic variables were routinely tested for association with military policy preference: Sex (scored (1) Female, (2) Male); Youth (scored (1) over 54, (2) 35 to 54, (3) over 54^{under 35?}); and Political Affiliation (scored (1) Republican, (2) Independent, (3) Democrat). Preliminary tests indicated that Region, City Size, and Religious Affiliation had little or no relation to military policy preferences and, hence, their possible role was not pursued in the present study. ^{Cath?}

Historical synopsis and trends over time -- Although the surveys analyzed spanned an 18 month period from April, 1951 to October, 1952, the military and diplomatic situation with respect to the Korean War remained reasonably stable throughout. General MacArthur was relieved of his command in April, 1951 shortly after the UN forces had fought their way back to the 38th parallel, after very nearly being pushed out of South Korea entirely by a sudden, massive influx of Chinese "volunteers." Subsequent congressional hearings firmly established that the UN objective was merely to defend South Korea and no longer to occupy and subdue North Korea. In June, preliminary feelers from the Soviet Union and China led to the opening of formal truce negotiations.

The remainder of the period through October 1952 was characterized by a costly military stalemate along the 38th parallel while the truce talks dragged on interminably, bogged down over apparently trivial issues such as the conditions

as bad
as VN

for a prisoner of war exchange. Thus, apart from the dismissal of MacArthur and the opening of truce negotiations, both of which occurred early in the period, there were no noteworthy military or diplomatic watersheds.

Probably as a consequence of this, the marginal distributions of the military policy items remained remarkably stable throughout the period. The largest change was in the percentage of the public saying the U.S. had been wrong to send troops to Korea in the first place. This rose from a low of 27% in April, 1951 to a high of 40% in May, 1952, falling back slightly to 38% in June. Other items showed even less fluctuation. The percentage saying that we should help defend another country attacked by Communist armies ranged between 61% and 66% throughout the period. Similarly, the percentage favoring bombardment of supply bases inside China ranged from 53% to 61%. In general, the fluctuations between adjacent surveys were of the same magnitude as those across the entire period. In short, there were no discernible stable trends either in a softer or tougher direction, only a slight increase in the public's disenchantment with the original U.S. intervention in Korea.

after MacA being [before?]

The Non-existence of a Single Soft-tough Dimension -- Initial efforts to explore the demographic correlates of military policy preferences used the strategy of summing the separate military policy items appearing on each survey to form a single soft-to-tough scale. The scale was then correlated with the several demographic variables. This strategy proved highly unsuccessful in that it yielded quite different patterns of association across different surveys -- evidently due to the somewhat different items that made up the scale on each survey. It is evident that such a strategy rests on the assumption that all military policy items fall on a single soft-to-tough dimension in such a way that agreement with certain policies logically implies disagreement with others (i.e., respondents favoring soft policies, such as withdrawal from Korea,

problem with "rank/done" split?

would be expected to oppose tough policies, such as bombing bases in China or declaring war on Russia). If such were the case, it would, indeed, make little difference what items happened to be included on a particular survey and, hence, on a particular soft-tough scale. As it happens, however, this assumption proved totally false.

When the items on military policy were systematically inter-correlated with each other, it became apparent that two distinct clusters were present: a Disengagement cluster containing all items whose softer alternative involved support of disengagement (e.g., pull out, stay out, wrong to send troops), and an Escalation cluster containing all items whose softer alternative involved a rejection of escalation (e.g., do not bomb China, continue the truce talks, disapprove aiding Formosa to attack China). Items in the first cluster had a median association of approximately .50, while those in the second cluster had a median association of approximately .40 (Gamma Coefficients). However, the median association between clusters was only about .10 indicating that escalation and disengagement are not nearly as opposite as one might assume -- instead, they are essentially uncorrelated.* While certain segments of the public (evidently including academics) do tend to view withdrawal as the opposite of escalation, this is evidently not the case in general.** It might seem almost a tautology to say that those who favored bombardment of bases inside China

*The two items offering respondents three choices, ranging from "pull out" to escalate, had stronger associations with the items in the Disengagement cluster (Median Gamma approximately .40), but were also associated with the items in the Escalation cluster (Median Gamma approximately .20).

** See an article by Brickman, Shaver and Archebald (1969) for a careful analysis of the extent to which a sample of academics do, in fact, order military policies on a soft-to-tough dimension.

not,
same
people:
1, 2 or
either/or?

would be more inclined to believe that the United States had been right to send troops to Korea, but our results discredit the validity of such an apparently innocuous assumption -- the median association between these two items across four surveys was only .09.

SES and Military Policy -- With the distinction between Disengagement items and Escalation items firmly in mind, the pattern of associations between SES and military policy preferences shown in the first five columns of Table 1 becomes clear. Each entry in this table is a median Gamma Coefficient based on all the surveys in which a given item appeared. The first five items belong to the Disengagement cluster, while the last four belong to the Escalation cluster. It is readily apparent that SES relates differently to the items in each of these clusters: higher SES is associated with greater rejection of *i.e. for* disengagement but not with greater support for escalation. This pattern is *stabilized* *(though getting* *escalation).* *as needed?* clearest for Economic Level, Education, and Information. Race deviates slightly, showing a positive association with two items in the escalation cluster -- Whites being more pro-escalation than Blacks. *Typ: "Marine now/sep"*

The last two columns of Table 1 show the associations with Sex and Political Affiliation. The pattern for Sex resembles that for Race with Males being both more rejecting of disengagement and slightly more supportive of escalation. Surprisingly, Political Affiliation shows very little association with any of the military policy items, except that Democrats are, predictably, more likely than Republicans to call the intervention in Korea by a Democratic administration "right." Beyond this, there is a very weak tendency for Democrats to be generally more supportive of administration policy in Korea -- rejecting both disengagement and escalation more than Republicans. On the disengagement side,

the weakness of this tendency is probably due to the fact that Democrats are of lower SES than Republicans and, hence, somewhat more pre-disposed to favor disengagement. On the escalation side, the tendency to reject is stronger but hardly notable. In general, it would seem that opinion on military policy is not related to political affiliation in any obvious way.*

Discussion -- During the Korean War, lower SES segments of the public were more "dovish" in the sense of being more pro-disengagement. This accords with much available data on the Vietnam War (Hahn, 1970; Gallup, 1970). However, our data caution us against interpreting this "dovishness" as an opposition to escalation -- Table 1 shows essentially no association between SES and support for escalation. Verba et al. (1967), working with data from the Vietnam War found a similar lack of association between SES and support for escalation. Their findings do deviate from our own in that they obtained only a negligible inverse correlation between SES and support for "de-escalation," but this can probably be attributed to the fact that their "de-escalation scale" focused less on military disengagement and more on political compromise. In accord with the Korean data, they did find that Race and Sex were the strongest demographic correlates of anti-war sentiment -- Blacks and Women being both more opposed to escalation and more in favor of de-escalation.

Despite the comparability of demographic findings across these two historical periods -- a feature first noted by Hamilton (1968), it is not difficult to understand why the limited association between SES and toughness went unnoticed until recently. In becoming more dovish as a consequence of the Vietnam War, social scientists have evidently altered their definition of "toughness."

*Two other demographic variables, Occupational Status and Youth, showed a pattern of association with military policy that resembled that of SES. However, associations with the disengagement items were generally weaker and, in the case of youth, disappeared entirely when education was controlled.

During the Korean period, most social scientists presumably supported administration policy and, hence, "tough" meant favoring escalation. By this definition, toughness was not associated with SES. At the same time, disengagement was seen as a somewhat irresponsible, isolationist policy not to be confused with reasonable efforts to step down the war and achieve an acceptable political settlement. Thus, those who supported disengagement were not seen as "dovish" but more nearly as unreasonable. *Still true! (esp. before May '70)*

* If social scientists, like others in academic life, have recently become somewhat more isolationist and considerably more alienated from administration policy, and if such attitudes are atypical for persons of high SES, then this suggests two possible explanations for the usual association between SES and military policy preference. According to the first, isolationism-internationalism is the critical intervening variable. Persons lower in SES can ordinarily be expected to have more limited horizons -- to be more concerned with their immediate environment and less concerned with the rest of the world. Hence, they are more likely to manifest a parochial resistance to all forms of "altruistic" foreign involvement, especially those that require the sacrifice of American men and material half-way round the world for apparently vague internationalist values. While being more likely to support disengagement, persons with such isolationist outlooks may not be more opposed to escalation because escalation often has ambiguous implications for the level of sacrifice and involvement -- it may decrease casualties and hasten the end of the war, or it may do just the opposite.

The second explanation focuses on alienation from government as the critical intervening variable. Persons higher in SES can ordinarily be expected to be more attached to the mainstream of political life -- to be more involved with

* or, less accepting / tolerant of endless war!

or, anti-
grand-
war!

government policy and to be more exposed to the mass media and other institutions that explain official policy and the rationales for it. As a consequence, persons of higher SES are more likely to support official government policy, not only because they better understand its purpose, but also because they are more likely to share with government officials the premises that make the policy seem reasonable -- e.g., the value of internationalism (Galtung, 1964; Gamson & Modigliani, 1966). This explanation predicts that SES should be inversely associated both with sentiment to disengage and with sentiment to escalate. The latter implication is not born out by the data (except in the case of extreme forms of escalation such as going to war with Russia). Perhaps, official government policy during a limited war includes a semi-tolerant attitude toward certain limited forms of escalation as a means of threatening the enemy and pressing for political settlement. At any rate, this second explanation does not appear to fit the data in Table 1 quite as easily as the first.

Both these explanations suggest particular intervening variables that ought to be associated both with SES and with military policy preferences. But the more general problem is that of finding the correct intervening variable -- of discovering the broader dimensions that do, in fact, underlie support for disengagement or support for escalation. In order to pursue this problem, several of the surveys were subjected to a factor analysis. The intent of this analysis was threefold: to see whether items reflecting isolationism or alienation from government did, in fact, tend to load on factors that included escalation or disengagement items; to search for other dimensions that might be associated with military policy preferences; and to establish a frame of reference that would permit replication of further analyses across different surveys (i.e., assuming similar factor structures emerged on different surveys, items with different wordings could then be equated by virtue of their high loadings on similar factors).

Dimensions Underlying Military Policy Preferences

Method -- All fixed alternative items that dealt with domestic or foreign policy were included in the factor analysis. Demographic variables and items assessing level of information were excluded. The typical survey contained some 25 items of which better than 20 were included, almost all dealing with aspects of international relations: attitudes toward the U.N., toward foreign aid, toward specific allies, and toward U.S. foreign policy both in general and in particular situations. Some items elicited estimates of the likelihood of events such as a major world war, or a new Communist invasion of another country. Others assessed the adequacy of governmental efforts to achieve certain objectives such as ending the Korean War or preventing a world war. A few dealt specifically with the issue of internal subversion: e.g., disloyalty in the State Department, its extent, and the adequacy of efforts to eradicate it.

All military policy items were scored in the manner discussed earlier. All other items were scored so as to permit meaningful linear associations with each other. The alternatives associated with each item were assigned sequential integers beginning with "1" in such a way as to capture their implicit ordering (e.g., "approve" to "disapprove," "too much" to "not enough," etc.). Almost all items offered the respondent either two or three fixed alternatives. Responses of "Don't know" were always assigned the value "2".

Each survey was factor analyzed separately using the Pearsonian r correlation matrix and a principal components analysis (unities in the diagonal) that extracted factors by the principal axis method of Hotelling (Couch & Armor, 1967). A ceiling of four was set on the number of factors to be extracted and the factor matrix was subjected to a Verimax Rotation.*

* Caspary (1970b) factor analyzes some of the same surveys starting from a correlation matrix of Gamma Coefficients and obtains nearly identical results.

A total of seven surveys were analyzed in this way. Three were selected initially because of the wide range of items they contained. Four others were added because they contained items that seemed most relevant based on results from the first three. A large number of items appeared on more than one of these surveys thus providing convenient points of reference for comparing the factors that emerged in each case.

International Interventionism and Administration Distrust -- The factor analyses yielded results that were remarkably stable across all seven surveys. In each and every case, the two factors capturing the largest amount of variance were clearly identifiable, very similar in content, and together accounted for approximately 30% of the total variance. This is an extraordinarily large amount of common variance for a set of items not written with an eye to homogeneity. In addition, the disengagement items loaded heavily on the first of these factors while the escalation items loaded somewhat on both but more heavily on the second. The third largest factor to emerge was recognizably similar on three of the surveys, but the fourth always differed. Here we shall be concerned only with the first two factors -- those that emerged stably in all surveys.

Table 2 provides a capsule summary of the several factor analyses: it lists all items with a median loading (across the seven surveys) of better than .45 on Factor I or II, and also indicates the median loadings of all military policy items.

Factor I has been labelled "International Interventionism" and appears to reflect the isolationist to internationalist dimension that was expected to emerge. The military disengagement items all load well on this factor as do the first 22 items listed in Table 2. These items express the common theme that the United States should play a strong, active role on the world stage.

Some advocate economic aid and technical assistance, others advocate military aid and deployment of troops in Europe, while still others advocate a posture of readiness to intervene in world trouble spots. Though these items have a strong internationalist flavor, it would be a mistake to view them as representing an idealistic sort of internationalism that desires involvement in the world in order to increase mutual understanding and cooperation. While some do have an idealistic quality, many are rather more antagonistic in tone and seem predicated largely on a desire to thwart world Communism. It is noteworthy, for example, that items expressing positive attitudes toward the U.N. did not load well on this factor.

The New Isolationists!
The factor appears to reflect a uniquely American brand of internationalism -- a brand that emerged following World War II when the United States abandoned entirely its earlier isolationist posture in order to assume the leadership of the "free world." In the post-war years, American foreign ^{policy} was a curious blend of altruism, activism, and self-righteousness -- it had an almost crusading quality that caused its major thrust to be less a matter of promoting world cooperation, and more a matter of bringing American resources to bear on the evils of the world. During the early 50's, the major source of evil was believed to be Communism and the conditions that bred it. In effect, then, those who agreed with the items loading on Factor I tended to accept the major premise of U.S. foreign policy in this period: that it was the duty of the United States to intervene on the world stage in order to set things right.*

oppose Cons

* Though somewhat dented by recent events in Southeast Asia, this premise probably continues to dominate our foreign policy even today as it has for the past quarter of a century (Caspary, 1970a). The following excerpt from a recent speech about South Vietnam by President Nixon illustrates well the special blend of altruism and self-righteousness: "when men write the history of this nation they will record that no people in the annals of time made greater sacrifices in a more selfless cause than the American people sacrificed for the right of 18 million people in a faraway land to avoid the imposition of

The second factor has been labelled "Administration Distrust" and bears only a vague resemblance to the "alienation from government" dimension that had been expected. Rather than reflecting a passive isolation from government policy and its rationales, the items that load high on this factor (items 23-39) appear to reflect a more active and bitter dissatisfaction with the performance of government on a wide variety of fronts. Their major thrust is that government officials were "not doing all they should" in coping with the problems that confronted them. This theme shades over into a belief that specific officials were incompetent and that certain persons in the State Department were disloyal and working against the interests of the country. Although most items deal with matters of foreign policy, the presence of one item referring specifically to domestic policy (#24) suggests that the syndrome transcended the realm of foreign policy and reflected a distrust of the Truman Administration more generally. As with Factor I, several items have a distinct anti-Communist flavor, but here the emphasis is either on the insufficiency of government efforts or on internal subversion. The themes expressed in these items are strongly reminiscent of the politics of Senator Joseph McCarthy who was just emerging on the political scene in 1951 (Lipset, 1963; Rogin, 1967). Though not yet well-enough known to have created this syndrome of distrust, it seems certain that he capitalized on its existence to vault himself into his later position of considerable power.*

Communist rule against their will and for the right of these people to determine their own future free of outside interference." (Los Angeles Times, April 20, 1970).

* In April 1953, almost six months after the last survey used in this study was conducted, fully 59% of the public had no opinion on Senator McCarthy (Rogin, 1967, p. 232). Thus, it seems unlikely that he was responsible for creating the syndrome reflected by Factor II.

Premise: Action to oppose "outside interference" (or Cons!) is not "interference!"

* cf. Hoesl Doctor

Administration Distrust should be viewed as a special case of "political distrust" and should not be confused either with political efficacy or with a generalized distrust of other people. Political distrust is a "negative evaluative orientation toward the government" (Stokes, 1963, p.), based on the belief that its outputs are unsatisfactory. As such, it is a political attitude conceptually distinct from a more general distrust of other people that borders on misanthropy. The two may sometimes be associated empirically (Rosenberg, 1956), but more often they are not (Litt, 1963) (Aberbach & Walker, 1970).^{*} In distinguishing political efficacy from political distrust, Gamson (1968) notes that "efficacy refers to people's perception of their ability to influence; (while) trust refers to their perception of the necessity for influence." Feeling that one is unable to influence the government, and perceiving that it is being run badly are different types of political attitudes. While the two may tend to co-vary, this, once again is an empirical question and not a matter of definitions. Finally, as Gamson (1968, pp. 49-50^{**}) notes, political distrust may be quite broad in its scope, encompassing the entire political community (as might be the case for a revolutionary movement) or it may be quite narrow, focusing only on the particular officials currently in power (as might be the case for a political party that is temporarily outside the government). Administration Distrust is evidently very close to the latter end of this continuum.

The bottom of Table 2 shows the median loadings of the nine military policy items on the two factors. In general, those items associated with the

^{*} Survey #329 contained the following item, "Do you think most people can be trusted?" It had no association with Administration Distrust.

^{**} Gamson's discussion draws heavily to the work of Easton (1965).

disengagement cluster (40 to 45) load heavily on International Interventionism, while those from the escalation cluster (46-48) load somewhat on both but more heavily on Administration Distrust. Item 40, stating that the U.S. was right to send troops to Korea, has a notable negative loading on Administration Distrust, evidently because its wording suggested a fairly explicit endorsement of the administration. Item 49, advocating going to war with Russia, has no loading on either factor despite its moderate association with other items in the escalation cluster. Apparently, this extreme form of belligerence is beyond the scope of the two factors under discussion here.*

Discussion -- The evident close connection between International Interventionism and opposition to military disengagement requires little discussion. It is apparent that opposition to withdrawal from Korea was only part of a broader posture based on the belief that the United States should play a strong, active role on the world stage. Those who favored such a posture supported the engagement in Korea, while those with more a isolationist stance tended to oppose it.

The connection between Administration Distrust and support for escalation is less easily understood. It is not surprising that Distrust should have been associated with a rejection of the administration's military policy, but it is less clear why this rejection should have taken the form of supporting escalation rather than disengagement. Possibly, the tendency to complain about

* This item did have substantial loadings on a third factor that emerged in three surveys. This factor reflected a general pessimism about the prospects of avoiding war and attaining a stable peace: e.g., another world war can be expected within 5 years, a new communist attack on another nation is likely soon, an agreement in Korea is unlikely to be reached soon, a long-period of peace cannot be expected to follow an armistice in Korea, etc. This suggests that the desire to go to war with Russia reflected a sentiment to "get it over with" since matters were likely to continue to deteriorate leading ultimately to world war anyway. (See also Caspary (1970b) for other speculations on this item.)

insufficient government efforts, so evident in the Distrust items, led most easily into a support for escalation. Or possibly the anti-Communism component of the Distrust syndrome was more consistent with a support for escalation. While this latter explanation might seem the more plausible, it should be remembered that the Interventionism Factor also had a component of anti-Communism without having any notable association with escalation. The anti-Communist component did take different forms in the two factors -- a propensity to support active steps to combat world Communism, versus a propensity to criticize the government for being "soft on Communists" -- but it is difficult to know what to make of these differences. At any rate, it is clear that persons with more dissatisfied, distrusting attitudes toward the administration were more prone to favor escalation, while those with more trusting attitudes were prone to reject escalation in favor of less belligerent administration policies.

Four Types of Persons and Their Military Policy Preferences

The independence of the two factors that emerged is quite consistent with the earlier noted lack of association between sentiment to escalate and sentiment to disengage. Taken together, these results suggest the usefulness of sub-dividing the Korean War public in two ways: Isolationists vs. Interventionists and Trusters vs. Distrusters. Since each division is independent of the other, the two can be used simultaneously to delineate four basic types of persons: Trusting-isolationists, Distrusting-isolationists, Trusting-interventionists, and Distrusting-interventionists. The factor analysis suggests that each of these types had a different preference ordering among alternative military policies. To keep matters simple, we shall focus on three alternatives in particular: disengagement, current policy, and escalation.

A

B

C

Table 3 summarizes the expected preference ordering of each of the four types. This table is based on the following simple assumptions derived from the factor analysis: Interventionists should oppose disengagement while Isolationists should favor it; Distrusters should favor escalation and tend to reject current policy, while Trusters should oppose escalation and tend to accept current policy. As can be seen from Table 3, the preference orderings that emerge are not only different for each type, but also not necessarily linear with a soft-to-tough dimension -- e.g., Distrusting-isolationists should prefer both disengagement and escalation to current policy.

Methods -- In order to test these expectations systematically, it was necessary to group respondents according to the four types and then examine their responses to the several military policy items. To accomplish this, all military policy items were first set aside to be used as dependent variables. The remaining items from each survey with better than .45 loadings on Interventionism or Distrust, respectively, were separately summed to create Interventionism and Distrust scales for each survey. In each case, respondents' scores on these scales were used to subdivide the samples into terciles. Those scoring in the middle tercile were then discarded so as to retain only the respondents who scored either high or low on both Interventionism and Distrust. These remaining respondents were then sorted into the four desired types. The intent in dropping the middle terciles was, of course, to purify the four types. In practice, this led to eliminating between 45% and 55% of the sample depending on the particular survey.*

Although this analysis was carried out on all surveys that had been factor

* Analyses using a median break on the Interventionism and Distrust Scales (and utilizing the full samples) yielded results quite comparable to those to be described below, but the differences among the types were, as expected, less dramatic and clearcut.

analyzed, some contained too few Interventionism or Distrust items to create entirely reliable scales. The results to be reported here come from surveys #315, 317, and 332 all of which contained at least four items on each scale. Survey #302 is also used, despite having a Distrust scale of only two items, because it contained some military policy items not found on the other three surveys. In general, the results from these surveys were quite similar to those that emerged on the other surveys containing less adequate scales.

Policy Preferences of The Four Types -- Table 4 shows the responses of the four types to eight separate military policy items.* As it turned out, these responses were quite consistent with the expectations summarized in Table 3. In examining the responses to each item, care must be taken to identify the implicit alternatives being offered to a respondent as these are critical to understanding the pattern of responses. *Since 2-dimensions*

Items 1 and 2 both offer the respondent a choice between disengagement and some version of current policy. Here, the two Isolationist groups and the two Interventionist groups agree on their preference ordering with the former being distinctly more for "pull out" or "stay out" than the latter.** Trust-distrust has virtually no effect because this dimension does not discriminate between the alternatives offered here.

Items 3 and 4 offer a respondent the full range of alternatives (disengagement, current policy, or escalation) and the results match Table 3 almost exactly.

* The item advocating war with Russia is not shown. There were no differences among the four types in their responses to it.

** Although the two isolationist groups are relatively more inclined to support the "pull out" alternative on item 1, a bare majority of them still opposes it. Clearly, the expectations summarized in Table 3 must be tempered by a consideration of baselines. Since only 20% of the entire sample favored pulling out, it would be unreasonable to expect an actual majority of the Isolationists to support it.

Trusting-isolationists favor "pulling out," Distrusting-isolationists split between "pull out" and "attack," Trusting-interventionists favor current policy, and Distrusting-interventionists favor "attack." For each group, the least favored alternative also matches the expectations in Table 3.

Item 5 offers the respondent a choice between disengagement (phrased as an explicit rejection of present policy) or else an explicit endorsement of current policy. Predictably, the major differences emerge between the Distrusting-isolationists and their opposite number the Trusting-interventionists. The former overwhelmingly reject the administration's decision to intervene in Korea, while the latter support it even more overwhelmingly. The remaining two groups fall in between with the Distrusting-interventionists being the more supportive because of their more favorable attitudes toward interventionist policies.

Items 6 and 7 offer the respondent a choice between escalation and some version of current policy. As expected, the two distrusting groups are the most prone to favor both bombing China and aiding Formosa to attack China. However, it is also apparent that these fairly aggressive policies are more appealing to Interventionists than Isolationists -- the former are more supportive of them across comparable levels of distrust. In a sense, items 6 and 7 offer respondents a choice between two forms of engagement: a more aggressive form, or a milder form reflected in current policy. Evidently, the more aggressive form does have some appeal to interventionists even though its greatest appeal is to those with distrusting attitudes toward the administration.

Finally, item 8 offers the respondent a choice between current policy and a somewhat ambiguous form of escalation. (Presumably, breaking off the truce talks would necessitate simply "fighting it out" in some manner.) Once again,

it is the two distrusting groups who are most favorably disposed toward the tougher alternative. In this case, however, the Isolationists are slightly more inclined than the Interventionists to favor breaking off the talks, presumably because such a policy can also be seen as a form of disengagement.

As a consequence, the major differences that emerge are between the Distrusting-isolationists, who prefer both escalation and disengagement to current policy, and the Trusting-interventionists, who have the opposite priorities.

Discussion -- Taken together, these results indicate that the Trusting-isolationists were the most "dovish" sector of the Korean War public while the Distrusting-interventionists were the most "hawkish" -- both had preference orderings linear on a soft-tough dimension, though opposite in direction. Presumably, these two groups contribute most to the general positive association between SES and toughness reported by Hamilton (1968). (As we shall see in a moment, these two groups are the most widely separated on measures of SES.)

same persons?

The military preferences of the remaining two groups cannot be ordered on a simple soft-to-tough dimension. The Distrusting-isolationists were evidently oriented toward "getting it over with." They were equally inclined to support disengagement or escalation while being distinctly opposed to administration policy. Thus, nearly 40% of this group favored immediate withdrawal from Korea, 64% favored bombing China, and fully 71% believed the administration's decision to intervene in Korea was wrong. On the other hand, the Trusting-interventionists were primarily oriented toward "carrying on." They opposed both disengagement and, to a lesser extent, escalation, while being most in favor of current policy. Thus, nearly 90% of this group opposed immediate withdrawal, 50% failed to support the bombing of China, and fully 91% endorsed the original U.S. intervention in Korea.

If these two groups (or ones comparable to them) can be identified in other war-time contexts, they may help to explain one of the most puzzling features of public opinion on military policy: namely, that a war-time administration can usually manage to increase its support either by stepping up or by stepping down the level of military activity (Converse & Schuman, 1970, pp. 21-22; Rosenberg, Verba & Converse, 1970, pp. 26-30). (For example, public support for President Johnson's handling of the war tended to increase following each cessation and resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. Similarly, President Nixon's support increased both in response to his announced plan for "phased withdrawal" and following the Cambodian invasion.) The Trusting-interventionists presumably contribute to such a phenomenon by being willing to follow the administration wherever it leads, while the Distrusting-isolationists contribute by being inclined to support any move toward either escalation or disengagement. The upsurge in support is, of course, short-lived because the Distrusting-isolationists should tend to revert to their disgruntled anti-administration position when the new initiative fails to "get the war over with."*

Another puzzling feature of public opinion on military policy is the apparent tendency for opposition to wars to increase most markedly following

* During the 1968 campaign, Distrusting-isolationists might well have accounted for the surprising number of voters who supported McCarthy or Kennedy in the primaries and then shifted to Wallace in November (Converse et al., 1969). All three candidates would have appealed to voters who distrusted President Johnson and wanted to end the war, though Wallace best embodied their military policy preferences with his "get out or do it right" platform. Consistent with this view, Rosenberg et al. (1970) report that, "Those who voted for McCarthy in the New Hampshire primary were more dissatisfied with Johnson's policies on Vietnam than those who voted for Johnson. But among McCarthy voters, those who were dissatisfied with Johnson for not pursuing a harder line outnumbered those who wanted a withdrawal by a margin of nearly three to two." (p. 49)

*This, a moral critique looks 3/5 of "anti-war" votes.
antagonism*

military setbacks. (For example, the proportion of the public believing that the U.S. intervention in Korea had been a mistake rose from 20% to 49% following the disastrous consequences of China's entry into the war (Erskine, 1970). The Tet offensive of 1968 had a similar though less dramatic impact.) Presumably, it is the two isolationist groups that contribute most to this effect. They are the most likely to become "war-weary" because they are oriented primarily to the costs of foreign involvements, whereas the Interventionists are oriented more to achieving certain political objectives and, hence, are more likely to hold on until these objectives are achieved.

Both isolationism and distrust of the administration might be expected to increase over time as a function of the length and frustrating nature of a foreign war. However, a careful study by Caspary (1970) shows that isolationist sentiments have shown but little tendency to fluctuate as a function of specific events over the two decades following World War II. Our own data support his findings -- over the 18 month period covered by this study, there was essentially no change in the marginal distributions of items loading on the Interventionist Factor. Hence, it seems more accurate to say that the absolute level of isolationist sentiment is a fairly stable property of public opinion; but that those who harbor such sentiments become increasingly likely to favor disengagement as the war becomes more frustrating. On the other hand, Administration Distrust does increase over the course of a frustrating war. For example, approval of President Truman's "handling of his job as president" fell from 46% to 23% over the course of the Korean War. Similarly, President Johnson's popularity fell from 69% to 36% over the course of his administration's efforts to deal with the Vietnam War (Gallup, 1970a, pp. 8-16).

*But see
muller, APSA, March 70*

Interventionism, Distrust, and Socio-economic Status

We now come full circle back to SES in order to examine its association with Interventionism and Distrust. The first two columns of Table 5 show these associations in the form of median Gamma Coefficients based on all available surveys. As expected, Interventionism is positively associated with all measures of SES. ^{Media/SES} Information is the strongest correlate of interventionism; sex has some association (with males being more pro-intervention); and political affiliation has virtually no association. Though the correlations with SES are not as strong as might have been hoped, it is clear that Interventionists tended to be of higher SES than Isolationists. This is consistent with both the models set forth earlier. In effect, Interventionists combined a traditional internationalist outlook with an acceptance of the basic premises of American foreign policy. Hence, persons higher in SES would be expected to be more interventionist both because their outlook on the world is likely to be less parochial, and because they are likely to be more in touch with the mainstream of political life. ^{and/or... (e.g. they benefit more from policy or believe they do).} cause
now
which
way?

The demographic correlates of Administration Distrust, shown in the second column of Table 5, are considerably more surprising. Distrust turns out to be positively associated with both SES and information in much the same manner as Interventionism.* However, the strongest correlate of Distrust is political affiliation -- Republicans were decidedly more distrusting than Democrats. It is plausible to argue that the positive associations between SES and Distrust arose because the Republicans were both more distrusting and higher in SES

* Both the Distrust and Interventionism scales were trichotomized at the terciles for these analyses. The two scales proved to be as uncorrelated as the Factors on which they were based -- their median intercorrelation across the eight surveys used was only -.07.

than Democrats. Controlling for political affiliation should then cause the associations to disappear. The last three columns of Table 5 show that this does not occur.* While the associations are greatly attenuated among Democrats and Independents, they become even more pronounced among Republicans. Clearly, higher status, better informed Republicans were the most distrusting sector of the public during this period of the Korean War. *vs. Lipset*

SES, Distrust, and Political Affiliation -- A number of plausible explanations can be offered for these findings. One possibility is that higher status Republicans were simply more "Republican" (or conservative) and, hence, more prone to distrust a liberal Democratic administration. There was no effective way to test this possibility since the surveys contained no measure of either conservatism or strength of party affiliation. A related explanation is based on the premise that higher status persons, being generally better educated and informed, are more likely to express opinions consistent with their basic political premises (Converse, 1964; Gamson & Modigliani, 1966; Sears, 1970, pp. 348-354). The major difficulty with this explanation is that higher status Democrats failed to show the expected parallel tendency toward greater trust -- if anything they, too, tended to be less trusting. In addition, other analyses indicated that differences between Democrats and Republicans (in level of Distrust) were not substantially greater at higher as opposed to lower levels of social status -- in general, marked differences existed even at lower levels.

A third possibility is that higher status, better informed Republicans were more influenced by the speeches of Senator McCarthy who, at this time,

* Only those demographic variables with notable zero-order associations were used in the control analysis. Race was dropped because Blacks were too few in number and too heavily concentrated in the Democratic Party. Controlling for political affiliation had no effect on the association between Interventionism and SES.

was expressing themes quite similar to those contained in the Distrust syndrome (Rogin, 1967).^{*} Though McCarthy was not yet well-known in 1951-52, he would probably have been best known to better informed Republicans. Even at the height of his popularity his major support came from Republicans (Polsby, 1963). It was not possible to test this explanation as the surveys contained no measures of familiarity with, or support for, McCarthy. However, Table 5 does show that Information was the strongest correlate of Distrust among Republicans.^{**}

The final possibility to be considered here is more complicated but also broader in its implications. Recall that persons scoring high on Distrust not only believed that the government was performing quite poorly but also that administration officials were incompetent and disloyal. The latter belief is noteworthy because it indicates that Distrusters were not satisfied to account for the government's poor showing in terms of the complexity of the problems it faced. Instead, they blamed it on the personal shortcomings of administration officials. Put in the language of attribution theory: they tended to attribute

^{*} This explanation was suggested by Phillip E. Converse (personal communication).

^{**} Assuming that the Distrust syndrome was capitalized on even if not created by McCarthy, our data bear directly on the continuing debate over the sources of McCarthy's support. Lipset (1963) and other "pluralist" theorists have argued that McCarthy's support was populist in nature -- largely bi-partisan and concentrated among lower and middle SES sectors especially among those subjected to status losses or status inconsistency (see Bell, 1963). However, Polsby (1963) found only small associations with SES and a strong tendency for Republicans to be more pro-McCarthy. Rogin (1967) places himself in direct opposition to the "pluralist" theorists, arguing that McCarthy's appeal was not populist but elitist, resonating most with the traditional conservative wing of the Republican Party. He dismisses McCarthy's somewhat greater support among the less educated as a superficial endorsement of an anti-Communist crusade not based on any real support of his ideology. If the Distrust syndrome reflects a receptiveness to McCarthy's ideology, then the present data give strong support to Rogin's argument: Distrust was greatest among high status Republicans.

i.e., voting behavior

the administration's poor performance to personal factors rather than to situational factors (Kelley, 1967).

Is there any reason to expect persons higher in SES to be more prone to make such attributions? A number of studies have shown that those higher in SES tend to be higher on "internal control" (Rotter, 1966) -- i.e., they are more likely to attribute events in their lives to internal factors such as effort or skill, rather than to external factors such as luck or others' malevolence or benevolence. Since persons higher in SES are, indeed, more in control of their environments, these findings are not surprising. However, they can be generalized to yield the following less obvious hypothesis: persons of higher SES, being less aware of the environment as a source of constraint, are more likely than persons of lower SES to attribute the poor performance of others to internal (personal) rather than to external (situational) factors.

To account for the findings of this study, it is necessary to add the assumption that this effect will be most pronounced among Republicans when the performance in question is that of a Democratic administration. In effect, party loyalty is likely to mitigate against personal attribution among higher status Democrats.

Now! An item included on survey #315 offered an unusual opportunity to test these speculations. It asked respondents whether they felt the government was "making any real progress in its efforts to stop the spread of Communism, or not." Thirty percent of the sample said it was not. (Naturally, this group tended to score high on the Distrust Scale -- 75% were above the median.) This group was then asked the following open-ended question: "Why do you feel they are making no progress?" Responses to this open-ended question could be grouped under three broad headings: The situation is complicated,* our policy

* For example: Communism is difficult to stop, hard to deal with; our aid program is not working; we are indirectly supplying the Communists with equipment; we can't seem to reach a solution in Korea; we need to take care of people and problems here at home first.

is not tough enough,* and our policy-makers are disloyal or incompetent.**

According to the preceding argument, two things should be true. First, respondents attributing the lack of progress to disloyalty or incompetence should score higher on the Distrust Scale than respondents making other kinds of attributions. Second, respondents of higher social status should be more prone to make the attribution to ^{McC; MacA} disloyalty or incompetence than respondents of lower status. The first of these hypotheses was clearly born out: 92% of the "incompetence or disloyalty" group scored above the Median on Distrust as opposed to only 72% and 66% of the "not tough enough" and "complex situation" groups ($\Gamma = .42$). Data pertinent to the second hypothesis are displayed in Table 6. Although all the measures of SES consistently show that higher status respondents were more likely than lower status respondents to make the expected attribution, the statistical significance of these associations is rather marginal. The strongest effects are for Race and Education.*** On the whole, these results must be considered impressive because the effect we are postulating must overcome a "sophistication factor": i.e., better educated respondents are more likely to have the conceptual skills and information needed to give answers referring to situation complexities. Thus, it is not too

* For example: they are too soft, conciliatory, or defensive in dealing with Communist countries; they don't take strong enough action against Communist groups here at home.

** For example: too many Communists in Washington; some officials are trying to help the Communists; officials are corrupt, selfish, playing politics, stupid, disorganized, confused, etc.

*** The results in Table 6 are not a spurious consequence of the fact that Democrats are both lower in SES and less prone to be critical of administration officials. While Democrats as a whole are less likely than Republicans to see a lack of progress against Communism, those who do see it are no different than like-minded Republicans in their willingness to attribute it to disloyalty or incompetence.

surprising that answers of this type showed little tendency to decrease at higher levels of status.*

In sum, only two of the four proposed explanations for the association between SES, Distrust, and political affiliation could be tested. Of these, only the one based on attribution theory received some support. Since the various explanations are not mutually exclusive, there is no reason why several could not have been operating simultaneously.

Demographic Composition of the Four Types -- Table 7 summarizes the demographic composition of the four types. It shows that Trusting-isolationists were the lowest in SES, the least well-informed, and contained the lowest proportion of males. Conversely, Distrusting-interventionists were the highest *Rank* in all three of these categories. The remaining two groups were intermediate and quite similar in demographic composition. Republicans were disproportionately over-represented in the two Distrusting groups. A separate analysis that controlled for political affiliation and percentaged by SES levels yielded the

*The "sophistication factor" may make it difficult to demonstrate the proposed association between status and attribution even when the question is not put in an open-ended manner as it was here. In many instances, to blame events on the personal shortcomings of actors is obviously more simple-minded than accounting for them in terms of environmental factors or more complex interactions. For example, Gallup asked the following question of a national sample in April 1963: "Who do you think is to blame for the present condition in which Negroes find themselves: white people or the Negroes themselves?" There was only a slight positive association between occupational status and propensity to hold whites responsible ($\Phi = .13$, $p = .05$). (Ross, 1971). Though counter to the prediction from the attribution argument, the weakness of the association is still noteworthy since the prediction is here pitted against both conceptual sophistication and racial prejudice.


A study by Sherwood and Nataupsky (1968) is particularly significant because it controls for conceptual sophistication by dealing only with a random sample of college-educated researchers (most with Ph.D.'s), all of whom had conducted research on Negro-white differences in I.Q. They found that researchers of higher SES background were more likely than those of lower SES background to conclude that Negro-white differences in I.Q. were due to innate rather than environmental factors.

following results: Republicans above the median on the SES index were heavily Distrusting-interventionists (50%), while those below the median were fairly evenly distributed across all four groups; Democrats above the median in SES were largely Trusting-interventionists (47%), while those below the median tended to fall in the two Isolationist groups (66%). In general, these findings are quite consistent with the correlational analysis displayed in Table 5 which was based on the full samples.*

Escalation and SES -- At least one puzzling feature remains in the overall picture that has been emerging: if Distrusting-interventionists and Trusting-isolationists were the most widely separated groups on measures of SES (Table 7), and if the former were the most pro-escalation while the latter were the most anti-escalation (Table 4), it may seem surprising that an overall positive association failed to emerge between SES and support for escalation (Table 1). Part of the answer lies with the remaining two groups: Distrusting-isolationists were slightly lower in SES than Trusting-interventionists but more prone to support escalation. Beyond this, it should be remembered that Tables 4 and 7 are both based on sub-samples of respondents who scored either quite high or quite low on Interventionism and Distrust. Hence, these tables exaggerate the overall associations of Distrust and Interventionism with both SES and escalation. Recall, for example, that Distrust had a notable association with SES only among Republicans (Table 5), who constitute about 30% of the total sample. Similarly, Interventionism and even Distrust had only moderate associations with escalation over the entire sample -- e.g., Distrust had median Gamma Coefficients of .29 with the "bomb China" item, .34 with the "aid Formosa" item, and .29 with the

* Table 7, like Table 4, is based only on that portion of the sample that scored either high or low on Interventionism and Distrust.

Support for Esc



"break off talks" item. In short, the zero-order correlations among these variables are not sufficiently strong to warrant the expectation of a notable association between SES and support for escalation.

Still the association might well have been stronger than it was. In order to pursue the matter further, analyses were undertaken to examine whether the military policy preferences of the four types might have differed at different levels of SES. This analysis revealed very few differences that held up reliably across different surveys. There was, however, a small but consistent tendency for persons in the two Trusting groups to be more opposed to escalation the higher they were in SES. This trend contributed to weakening the association between SES and escalation -- it added enough higher status persons to the anti-escalation camp to offset the general tendency of higher status persons to be more distrusting and, hence, more pro-escalation.

Summary and Conclusions

The key finding of this study was that public opinion on military policy could not be organized in terms of a single "hawk to dove" dimension. Sentiment to escalate and sentiment to disengage did not emerge as opposite poles of a single continuum. Instead, they emerged as independent paths leading away from current policy. Those who favored one of these paths were not necessarily inclined to reject the other -- sentiment to escalate and sentiment to disengage had only a slight inverse association. Thus, a notable segment of the public had ^{non-linear, multi-dimensional} "intransitive" preference orderings wherein they preferred both escalation and disengagement to current policy.

Opposition to disengagement came predominantly from a sector of the public that was internationalist and interventionist in outlook. This segment supported all forms of foreign aid and tended to accept the basic premise of

A/C B
B A/C

American foreign policy in this period: that the United States should be ready and willing to help out ^{help - cautiously} wherever the values of the "Free World" seemed in jeopardy. Not surprisingly, those most imbued with this "enlightened" orientation tended to be from the higher strata of society -- white, better educated, better informed, and more wealthy. Conversely, those more toward the periphery of the society, with more parochial outlooks and less exposure to the official values of American foreign policy, tended to be isolationist in outlook and constituted the bulk of support for military disengagement.

Women also tended to fall in the isolationist-disengagement camp, presumably because their predominant orientation to the family environment isolates them from the mainstream of national affairs as surely as low SES.* In addition, of course, less belligerent attitudes are consistent with the traditional female sex role. ?!
oh...!
(these things
leads to
them being
ignored).

Those with interventionist orientations were only moderately inclined to support escalation. The bulk of pro-escalation sentiment came from a sector of the public that harbored a marked distrust of the Truman administration. This group not only felt that the administration was dealing inadequately with the problems confronting it, but also believed that some officials were incompetent and others actually disloyal. Predictably enough, such attitudes were much more prevalent among Republicans than Democrats. More surprisingly, they were most prevalent among Republicans of higher SES. A number of plausible explanations for this result were set forth earlier and will not be reviewed here. In general, those with trusting attitudes toward the Truman administration

This - to satisfy this would not necessarily have removed distrust, or war votes.

* Women tend to score much lower than men on measures of political knowledge even when education is controlled.

but why?

formed the bulk of support for current policy as against escalation.*

Since those with Interventionist outlooks had only the slightest tendency to be more trusting of the Truman administration, it proved useful to conceive of the Korean public as divided into four segments -- each with a characteristic outlook on the war, and each with a unique preference ordering among military alternatives. Trusting-isolationists were oriented to getting out of the war and favored disengagement while opposing escalation; Distrusting-isolationists were oriented to getting the war over with and favored both escalation and disengagement to current policy; Trusting-interventionists were oriented to carrying on with the war effort and favored current policy while opposing both disengagement and, to a lesser extent, escalation; finally, Distrusting-interventionists were oriented to winning the war and favored escalation while rejecting disengagement.

How useful this framework will prove in understanding Vietnam public opinion remains to be seen. The author is now in the process of extending his analysis to this period, seeking to identify comparable segments in the public. In the meantime, certain important parallels between these historical periods can be noted. First, Vietnam opinion shows a similar lack of clear inverse association between sentiment to escalate and sentiment to disengage.

* Negroes were a markedly dovish sector of the public during both the Korean and Vietnam wars. Verba et al. (1967) attribute their Vietnam attitudes to a disenchantment with, and lack of commitment to, American society. While this explanation is certainly plausible, especially in view of the civil rights turmoil that coincided with the Vietnam War, the Korean data, at least, can be explained simply in terms of the social characteristics of Negroes. Not only were Negroes on the periphery of the society and, hence, isolationist, but they were also heavily loyal to the Democratic party and, hence, Trusting.

Negroes combat intervention drifters.

Verba et al. (1967) report only a $-.37$ correlation between their Escalation and De-escalation scales. Had their De-escalation scale focused more exclusively on disengagement rather than including items about coalition government, free elections, and a U.N. supervised truce, the correlation might have been still weaker.

We have already reviewed the demographic correlates of support for withdrawal and noted their similarity to those found during the Korean War. Taken together, these findings point rather clearly to the same Isolationist-Interventionist dimension found in the Korean data.

The issue of political distrust and support for escalation is more complex. It is clear that the Johnson administration suffered a loss of trust quite comparable in magnitude to that experienced by the Truman administration (Gallup, 1970q, pp. 8-16). However, the quality of this distrust was different. Rather than centering on issues of internal subversion or being "soft on Communists," it centered on a "credibility gap" -- on a belief that the administration was being less than candid in its reports to the public. Presumably, this form of distrust, like its counterpart in Korea, could be expected to produce a disenchantment with current military policy, but it is less clear whether it should lead to support for escalation.* Brody (1968) does report one interesting finding: in 1966 those who disapproved of President Johnson's handling of the war favored de-escalation over escalation, but by 1967 this same group (now 50% more numerous) had shifted toward somewhat greater support of escalation

* The problem is further complicated by the fact that the Johnson administration took a number of escalatory steps thus blurring the distinction between escalation and current policy. Presumably such steps would receive their greatest support from the politically distrusting prior to their implementation, but should be adopted by the politically trusting once implemented.

rejected by distrusting after failing.

(Robinson & Jacobson, 1969, p. 68). Thus, there is some tangential evidence linking the increase in distrust with greater support for escalation, but until more direct analyses are undertaken, we are left largely in the realm of speculation. The consequences of the war being passed on to a Republican administration are even more a matter of conjecture.* *implication?!*

Perhaps the general area of greatest importance for future research is that of mapping the cognitive orientations of different segments of the public. One need not assume that these orientations will approach the consistency of well-formed ideologies to admit their usefulness in understanding military policy preferences. Failure to ascertain these orientations merely tempts us to superimpose our own biased conjectures.

At the outset of this study, for instance, the author considered it a foregone conclusion that most of the public evaluated military alternatives on a "soft-to-tough" dimension. Only repeated failures to make sense of the data forced him to realize that different segments of the public were evaluating military policies from very different vantage points. Interventionists, for example, probably were oriented to a "soft-tough" dimension in the sense of being concerned with the force needed to attain desired international objectives. Yet, even within this group, many were probably more concerned with supporting or opposing the administration than with making strategic judgments. Isolationists, on the other hand, seemed primarily oriented to the costs associated with foreign involvements and probably had little

* The most interesting questions here center on the reversibility of trusting and distrusting attitudes. Do Republicans now become trusting while Democrats become distrusting, or are the dissidents likely to remain so until the war is settled? Another important issue concerns the role of opposition leaders. If such leaders tend to favor disengagement rather than escalation, will this encourage distrusting persons to have similar preferences, or will the positive association between distrust and escalation continue to hold?

appreciation of international objectives or the force needed to attain them.

While some did favor tougher policies, this stance more nearly reflected a desire to terminate the involvement quickly than a concern with achieving political objectives.

It is these sorts of broader cognitive orientations that need to be mapped and further explored. New techniques of multi-dimensional scaling should prove useful in this endeavor (see Robinson & Hefner, 1967; Wish et al., 1970), but the groundwork must be laid through open-ended questions. We must beware of relying prematurely on fixed-alternative items, for, we run too great a risk of imposing our own cognitive maps on the respondent. In losing the respondent's perspective, we lose precisely that information that ultimately will prove most valuable in understanding public opinion on military policy.

References

Aberbach, J.D. & Walker, J.L. Political trust and racial ideology. American Political Science Review, 1970, 64, 1199-1219.

✓ Armor, D.J., Giaquinta, J.B., McIntosh, R.G. & Russell, D.E.H. Professors' attitudes toward the Vietnam War. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1967, 31, 159-175.

Bell, D. (Ed.). The Radical Right. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963.

✓ Brickman, P., Shaver, P. & Archibald, P. American tactics and American goals in Vietnam as perceived by social scientists. in W. Isard (Ed.), Vietnam: Issues and Alternatives. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1969, 80-104. DSS57
A 692
176
nerve

✓ Brody, R. Vietnam and the 1968 election: A preview. Trans-action, 1968, ~~November~~
October, 16-23.

✓ Caspary, W.R. The "Mood Theory": A study of public opinion on foreign policy. American Political Science Review, 1970a, 64, 536-547.

✓ Caspary, W.R. Dimensions of attitudes on international conflict: Internationalism and military offensive action. Peace Research Society (International) Papers, 1970b, 13, 1-10. JX1907
P355
A 3

Converse, P.E. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. in D. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent, 1964, 206-261.

✓ Converse, P.E., Miller, W.E., Rusk, J.G. & Wolfe, A. Continuity and change in American politics: Parties and issues in the 1968 election. American Political Science Review, 1969, 63, 1083-1105.

✓ Converse, P.E. & Schuman, H. "Silent majorities" and the Vietnam War. Scientific American, 1970, 222, ^{Vol 1}₁₇ 17-25.

Couch, A.S. & Armor, D.J. The Data-text system: Preliminary Manual. (Harvard University, Department of Social Relations, Multilithed), 1967, 265-304.

Easton, D. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley, 1965.

✓ Erskine, H. The polls: Is war a mistake? Public Opinion Quarterly, 1970, 34, 134-150.

Gallup Opinion Index. Princeton, New Jersey: Gallup International, Inc., Report 21, 1967.

Gallup Opinion Index. Princeton, New Jersey: Gallup International, Inc., Report 32, 1968a.

Gallup Opinion Index. Princeton, New Jersey: Gallup International, Inc., Report 34, 1968b.

Gallup Opinion Index. Princeton, New Jersey: Gallup International, Inc., Report 56, 1970a.

Gallup Opinion Index. Princeton, New Jersey: Gallup International, Inc., Report 64, 1970b.

Gallup Political Index. Princeton, New Jersey: Gallup International, Inc., Report 9, 1966a.

Gallup Political Index. Princeton, New Jersey: Gallup International, Inc., Report 13, 1966b.

Galtung, J. Foreign policy opinion as a function of social position. Journal of Peace Research, 1964, 1, 206-231.

Gamson, W.A. Power and Discontent. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968.

✓ Gamson, W.A. & Modigliani, A. Knowledge and foreign policy opinions: Some models for consideration. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1966, 30, 187-199.

✓ Hahn, H. Correlates of public sentiment about war: Local referenda on the Vietnam issue. American Political Science Review, 1970, 64, 1186-1198.

✓ Hamilton, R.F. A research note on the mass support for "tough" military initiatives. American Sociological Review, 1968, 33, 439-445.

Kelley, H.H. Attribution theory in Social Psychology. in D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln, Nebraska: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1967.

Lipset, S.M. Democracy and working-class authoritarianism. American Sociological Review, 1959, 24, 482-501.

Lipset, S.M. Political Man. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960.

Lipset, S.M. Three decades of the radical right. in D. Bell (Ed.), The Radical Right. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963, 391-421.

Litt, E. Political cynicism and political futility. The Journal of Politics, 1963, 23, 320.

✓ Palsby, N.E. Toward an explanation of McCarthyism. in Palsby, N.W., Deutler, R.A. & Smith, P.A. (Eds.), Politics and Social Life. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 809-824. JA71 P778

Robinson, J.P. & Hefner, R. Multidimensional differences in public and academic perceptions of nations. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1967, 2, 196-206.

- Robinson, J.P. & Jacobsen, S.G. American public opinion about Vietnam. in W. Isard (Ed.), Vietnam: Issues and Alternatives. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1969.
- Rogin, M.P. The Intellectuals and McCarthy. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967.
- Rosenberg, M. Misanthropy and political ideology. American Sociological Review, 1956, 21, 690-695.
- Rosenberg, M.J., Verba, S. & Converse, P.E. Vietnam and the Silent Majority: The Dove's Guide. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
- Ross, M. Resistance to Social change in the urban North. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, Department of Social Relations) 1971.
- Rotter, J.B. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80, No. 1.
- Schuman, H. & Laumann, E. Do most professors support the war? Trans-action, 1967, November, 32-35.
- Sears, D.O. Political behavior. in Lindzey, G. & Aronson, E. (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969, 2nd edition, Vol. 4, 315-451.
- Sherwood, J.J. and Nataupsky, M. Predicting the conclusions of Negro-White intelligence research from biographical characteristics of the investigator. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 53-58.
- Stokes, D.E. Popular evaluations of government: An empirical assessment. in H. Cleveland & H.D. Lasswell (Eds.), Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political, and Military. New York: Harper, 1962.
- Verba, S., Brody, R., Parker, E.B., Nie, N.H., Polsby, N.W., Edman, P. & Black, G. Public opinion and the war in Vietnam. American Political Science Review, 1967, 61, 317-333.
- Wish, M., Deutsch, M. & Biener, L. Differences in conceptual structures of nations: An exploratory study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 361-373.

TABLE 1

DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF MILITARY POLICY ITEMS

(Median Gammas: NORC 302, 307, 314, 315, 317, 320, 327, 329, 332)

	SES Index	Econ. Level	Race (W+)	educat.	informat.	Sex (M+)	Polit. Affil. (D+)
1) Right to send troops to Korea	.14	.10	.20	.23	.18	.14	.18
2) Oppose pulling troops out of Korea	.26	.30	.38	.29	.50	.26	.05
3) Help defend another nation attacked by Comm. armies	.21	.17	.33	.26	.35	.27	.08
4) Policy for Korea: pull out/ continue/ attack	.17	.18	.46	.22	.21	.18	-.06
5) Policy if talks break down: pull out/ hold line/ attack	.25	.22	.37	.22	.27	.26	-.03
6) Bomb bases inside China	.05	.02	.41	.04	.08	.24	-.13
7) Aid Formosa to attack China	.04	.07	.36	-.05	.00	.13	-.13
8) Break off truce talks	-.11	-.07	.04	-.13	-.02	.10	-.07
9) Go to war with Russia	-.20	-.17	.07	-.30	-.20	.03	.09

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF FACTOR ANALYSIS OF EIGHT NORC SURVEYS:

MEDIAN ITEM LOADINGS ON TWO LARGEST FACTORS UNDER VERIMAX ROTATION

(Based on NORC Surveys # 302, 307, 314, 315, 317, 327, 329, 332)

Surveys on which items appear	Items	Factor I	Factor II
		International Interventionism	Administration Distrust
332	1. Good for U.S. to be active in world affairs	 Median	*
332	2. Important for U.S. to cooperate closely with four allies		*
317, 329	3. Helping poor nations raise standard of living is good policy		*
314	4. Approve economic aid to W. Eur.		#
302	5. Approve of economic aid to friendly countries in Asia		*
315	6. Approve of giving further financial aid to England		*
315	7. Govt. should build defenses and aid allies despite higher taxes		*
315	8. U.S. should spend more to help W. Eur. build up defenses		#
302, 307, 314, 317, 329	9. Country has not made enough sacrifices for defense		*
317	10. Sending troops, military and economic aid to allies is helpful policy		*
314, 327	11. Approve of sending military supplies to W. Eur.		*
302, 327	12. Approve of sending military supplies to Asian allies		*
302	13. U.S. should spend more on military supplies for our allies		*
302, 307, 315	14. Approve of stationing U.S. troops in Eur. to build defenses		*
317	15. Stopping Comm. more important than staying out of war		*
329	16. Events in Middle-East are important to U.S.		*
327	17. U.S. should encourage rebellions in E. Eur.		**
317	18. Comm. seizure in Iran would be serious for U.S.		**
329	19. U.S. should do something if Comm. seize control in Iran		*
327	20. U.S. should help Comm. refugees from E. Eur.		*
332	21. U.S. defense program relies on raw material from other nations		*
315	22. U.S. can count on five allies for cooperation		*

TABLE 2 (Cont.)
SUMMARY OF FACTOR ANALYSIS

Surveys on which items appear	Items	Factor I International Intervention- ism	Factor II Adminis- tration Distrust
all	23 Disapprove govt. handling of foreign affairs	*	 Median Loadings Larger than .45
314, 332	24 Disapprove of govt. handling of domestic policy	*	
317	25 Disapprove govt. handling of Comm. jailing of U.S. citizens	*	
314	26 Govt. has no definite plan for dealing with Russia	*	
317	27 Govt. did not <u>do all it should</u> to prevent fall of China	*	
315, 332	28 Govt. did not <u>do all it should</u> to prevent outbreak of Korean War	*	
332	29 Govt. not doing all it should to reach Korean accord	*	
317, 329	30 Govt. not <u>doing all it should</u> to prevent spread of Comm.	*	
315	31 Govt. not <u>doing all it should</u> to avoid another World War	*	
315, 329	32 State Dept. is <u>not doing all it can</u> to eliminate disloyalty	*	
329	33 Some officials in State Dept. are disloyal	*	
315	34 Disloyalty in State Dept. is hurting country	*	
317, 329	35 Acheson doing poor job and should be replaced	*	
302, 314, 315	36 Truman was wrong in dismissing MacArthur	*	
327, 329	37 Dissatisfied with allies cooperation with U.S. against Comm.	*	
329	38 Allies will not do their share in building up defenses	*	
314	39 W. Eur. not doing all it should to build up armed forces	*	

** Median loading between .16 and .25

* Median loading between -.15 and +.15

Median loading between -.25 and -.16

TABLE 2 (Cont.)

SUMMARY OF FACTOR ANALYSES

Surveys on which items appear		Factor I International Interventionism	Factor II Adminis- tration Distrust
302, 307, 314 315, 327	40. Right to send troops to Korea	.63	-.21
302, 307 327	41. Oppose pulling troops out of Korea	.73	-.02
315, 317, 327	42. Oppose pulling U.S. troops out of W. Berlin	.53	-.11
314, 315, 317	43. Help defend another nation attacked by Communist armies	.63	.09
327, 329, 332	44. Policy for Korea: pull out/ continue/ attack	.45	.19
302, 307, 327 329	45. Policy if talks break down: pull out/ hold line/ attack	.62	.15
302, 307	46. Bomb supply bases inside China	.25	.61
314, 317, 327 329	47. Give Formosa aid to attack China	.13	.69
315, 327, 332	48. Break off truce talks now	-.15	.33
	49. Go to war with Russia now	.06	-.03

Assumption:

Distrust goes with anti-Comm

Ass: Favor Disen.

Int: ~~Disen~~ Disen ^{current} ~~Pol~~ Pol, Favor Esc

Dist: ~~Favor Esc~~ Reject Pol

Int: accepts Pol

TABLE 3

— EXPECTED PREFERENCE ORDERINGS OF FOUR
TYPES ON MILITARY POLICY

[Data doesn't show
anyone's second choice]

% of pop?

Lower middle-class
repts

	Isolationists		Interventionists JCS	
	Trusting	Distrusting	Trusting	Distrusting
Favors	disengagement	disengage/escalat.	↑ ? current policy	escalation
Accepts	current policy	disengage/escalat. ^{ignored by CFR?}	disengage/escalat.	current policy
Rejects	escalation	current policy	escalation	disengagement
Opposes				
	A B C	A/C B	B A/C	C B A

B is "Opposed" by none ; A, C each Opposed by 2 groups

It is 1st choice of TI's (CFR), 2d choice of ~~other~~ 2, 3d to 1

What will DTs say after a Defeat?

Dynamics of views after "loss, failure..."

JFK, McN, Rush, AK "sin" : disengagement is as bad as escalation ;

"even stalemate" is much better

("not-losing"). "Win" was not available with

Escalation ; or they would have favored it.

Choice was seen by Adm (not by JCS) as

"Loss" (not really certain) or "Stalemate" (with a small

chance of Win) ; they chose cheapest form of latter

(not form of Escalation), not stalemate for small improvements
in chance of Win.

2 groups would have
preferred Disengagement
in short-run ; yet 3,
even 4, might have later
attacked Order for
Defeat.

TABLE 4
INTERVENTIONISM, DISTRUST, AND MILITARY POLICY^a
(In Percent)^b

			Isolationist		Interventionist		Full Sample Marginals
			Trust	Distrust	Trust	Distrust	
(NORC 302, 4/51) n =			(183)	(170)	(206)	(170)	Phi = .39
1) Pull troops out of Korea or keep there?	Pull out		28	38	9	11	21
	Don't know		20	9	3	9	11
	Keep there		52	52	88	81	70
(NORC 317, 2/52) n =			(166)	(166)	(196)	(205)	Phi = .50
2) Help defend other nations attacked by Comm. armies?	Stay out		61	65	20	15	38
	Don't know		10	5	5	3	7
	Help defend		28	30	75	82	56
(NORC 317, 2/52) n =			(166)	(166)	(196)	(205)	Phi = .51
3) What should we do now in Korea?	Pull out		52	43	15	8	28
	Don't know		10	4	4	5	6
	Cont. as now		21	10	48	28	27
	Attack Ch. Cm.		17	43	33	60	39
(NORC 332, 10/52) n =			(174)	(141)	(169)	(180)	Phi = .53
4) If the talks broke down, what should we do then?	Pull out		41	54	10	21	30
	Don't know		18	9	6	7	11
	Hold pres. line		27	11	60	24	30
	Attk. w/evry th.		14	26	24	48	29
(NORC 315, 12/51) n =			(71)	(191)	(166)	(99)	Phi = .60
5) Was U.S. right or wrong to send troops to Korea?	Wrong		39	71	7	27	34
	Don't know		16	6	2	7	9
	Right		45	23	91	67	57
(NORC 302, 4/51) n =			(183)	(170)	(205)	(169)	Phi = .40
6) Should U.S. bomb supply bases inside China?	Should not		45	27	35	12	27
	Don't know		27	9	15	4	18
	Should		28	64	50	84	56
(NORC 302, 4/51) n =			(184)	(169)	(206)	(170)	Phi = .44
7) Approve U.S. aid Formosa for attack on China?	Disapprove		46	28	34	11	25
	Don't know		30	13	9	5	17
	Approve		24	59	57	85	59
(NORC 317, 2/52) n =			(166)	(165)	(194)	(205)	Phi = .33
8) Should we break off the truce talks now?	Continue		48	38	72	53	55
	Don't know		26	12	8	6	13
	Break off		27	50	20	41	32

^a upper and lower terciles of Interventionism and Distrust Scales are used to create four types-- middle terciles are dropped.

^b Columns in each table sum to 100%.

TABLE 5

DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF INTERVENTIONISM AND DISTRUST

(Median Gammas: NORC 302, 314, 315, 317, 320, 327, 329, 332)

	Full Samples		Only Republicans	Only Democrats	Only Independents
	International Interventionism	Adminis. Distrust	Adminis. Distrust	Adminis. Distrust	Adminis. Distrust
SES Index	.27	.20	.27	.08	.04
Education	.28	.24	.27	.11	.09
Occup. Status	.18	.16			
Econ. Level	.24	.25	.30	.08	.08
Race (White+)	.33	.34			
Sex (Male+)	.18	.07			
Youth	.18	-.08			
Polit. Affil. (Dem+)	.07	-.44			
Information	.38	.29	.36	.11	.12

TABLE 6
SOCIO-ECONOMIC-STATUS AND ATTRIBUTION OF POOR
GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE TO DISLOYALTY OR INCOMPETENCE
(Data from NORC 315, in Percent)^a

Why no progress against Communism?

			Complex situation	not tough enough	Disloyalty or incompetence	
SES INDEX	Low	(68) ^b	31	56	13	100%
	Med. Low	(81)	36	42	22	100%
	Med. High	(55)	24	47	29	100%
	High	(68)	24	43	34	100%
			Gamma = .13, p = .25 ^c			
EDUCA- TION	0 to 11th	(215)	30	51	19	100%
	12th & over	(141)	27	39	34	100%
			Gamma = .20, p = .02 ^c			
RACE	Non-white	(23)	48	52	0	100%
	White	(332)	27	39	34	100%
			Gamma = .54, p = .03 ^c			
ECONOMIC LEVEL	Low	(104)	26	58	16	100%
	Medium	(189)	32	41	27	100%
	High	(60)	27	40	33	100%
			Gamma = .09, p = .10 ^c			
Marginals			29	46	25	100%

^aIncludes only respondents who felt the govt. was making "no real progress in its efforts to stop the spread of communism."

^bFigures in parentheses are n's on which row percents are based.

^cSignificance levels are based on chi-square.

TABLE 7
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE FOUR TYPES
(Data from NORC 317 in Percent)^a

		Isolationists		Interventionists		Full Sample Marginals
	n =	Trusting (166)	Distrusting (166)	Trusting (196)	Distrusting (205)	
SES INDEX	Low	47	26	17	14	26
	Med-Low	31	26	29	23	26
	Med-High	16	22	28	24	24
	High	6	26	26	39	24
EDUCATION	0 to 11th	87	61	59	41	61
	12th & over	13	38	41	59	39
ECONOMIC LEVEL	Low	51	29	25	19	31
	Medium	42	54	55	53	52
	High	7	17	20	29	17
INFORMA- TION	Low	60	37	24	9	33
	Medium	40	63	76	91	67
SEX	Female	61	49	46	44	51
	Male	39	51	54	56	49
POLITICAL AFFILIA- TION	Republican	20	45	20	42	30
	Independent	10	23	16	20	20
	Democrat	70	32	64	37	50

^aColumns in each table sum to 100%